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Living with non-state policing in South Africa: the issues and dilemmas 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Though policing is widely regarded as an inherently public good, in reality non-state 
policing is widespread in South Africa, doing everything that the public police force 
does.  The paper examines the extent, nature and attitudes towards, non-state policing in 
South Africa in its different forms, that is, autonomous citizen responses, ‘responsible’ 
citizen responses and commercial private security.  The paper concludes by assessing the 
social and political implications of non-state policing.   
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Policing is an elastic concept, but is normally associated with an array of functions 
including regulating society and maintaining order, preventing crime, responding to 
crime and restoring order, and the use if necessary of instruments of coercion to assist in 
any of those roles.  The nature of these functions cause policing to be widely regarded as 
an inherently public good, whose provision should reside in the hand of a single 
monopoly supplier, the democratic state. In the state’s hands, it is argued, policing 
activities can be required to be accountable, consistent and humane. Given this prevailing 
discourse, therefore, it is remarkable that in reality, policing by formal and informal 
groups other than the state police is so widespread in democracies and has been for a very 
long time.  In the case of South Africa it is found engaged in street patrolling, guarding 
private and public property, order maintenance, arrest, search, detection, surveillance, 
inspection, traffic control, crowd marshalling, risk management, the transportation of 
cash and personal escort/protection.  In fulfilling many of these duties it bears firearms 
and other means of coercion, such as handcuffs, truncheons and pepper spray to, if 
necessary, enforce its activities. In other words, such policing groups do everything that 
the public police force does and do it as the police do it. Or, put another way, ‘policing’ is 
a broader activity than simply what The Police do.  
    The ubiquity of contemporary non-state policing raises important normative and policy 
issues about what attitude democracies should take to it.  Does it constitute a vital 
assistance to weak states faced with under-resourced public police, or does it constitute a 
threat to the state by allowing a function to be conducted by private elements over which 
the state should have a monopoly?  How should states respond to it?  This paper sets out 
to address these questions with respect to democratic South Africa.  In particular, it will 
outline the extent and nature of non-state policing and the political attitudes to it, before 
considering their implications to state policing and communal life in South Africa.   
    Non-state policing is a broad category that can cover anything from the commercial 
security firms, through semi-official community guards and patrols, to formal and 
informal vigilante groups.  Bringing together into a single analytical category such 
diverse activity is not, however, without its problems.  Some would insist that collapsing 
the whole field of policing that takes place outside of the public sphere, is to merge 
phenomena that are inherently separate.  It is true that vigilantism and commercial 
security firms, to take both ends of the non-state policing spectrum, have significant 
differences in their organisational structure, legality and how they define social deviance 
and the type of ‘order’ they wish to establish.  Nevertheless they do have important 
features in common.  Both are forces of coercion engaged by groups of society to 
preserve social order.  And both, despite the rhetoric of the state, are controlled only 
poorly or not at all by state institutions and have minimal accountability to the public.  
They may well be concentrated in particular communities distinguished by their race and 
class, but they have similar origins.  First, they are continuations of an established culture 
of self-reliance; for the white community, what might be loosely termed a ‘frontier’ 
culture; and for the black community, the traditional forms of village and clan protection 
and popular justice.  Second, they both arise from communal dissatisfaction with the state 
policing services as experienced under apartheid and under the current democratic 
regime.  Non-state policing, whatever its form, is shaped, not by the national public 
agenda, but largely by their clients, who individually or communally provide the financial 
and/or social support for the groups to operate on their behalf.  The whole spectrum, 
therefore, arises from similar roots, similar needs, similar relationships and even at times 
employ the same people.  The fact that, whatever their form, non-state policing services 
by-pass the South African Police Service (SAPS), means that they also have similar 
implications for the perception and role definition of the SAPS.  The debate on policing 
in South Africa and the contribution of the state cannot ignore them.  This paper, 
therefore, argues, as Johnson in his, The Rebirth of Private Policing (Johnson 1992), that 
there is considerable analytical gain to be had from taking them together.   
    As for an inclusive collective term, there is much to be said for calling these services 
‘private’ policing, as the antonym of ‘public’ policing.  Both Johnston and Schonteich 
discuss vigilantism in terms of ‘private policing’ and Alice Hills, in her recent book 
Policing Africa, writes of informal systems under the heading ‘The growth of private 
policing’ (Johnson 1992; Schonteich 1999; Hills 2000).  Nevertheless, the common use 
of ‘private policing’ in South Africa to indicate commercial security firms makes this 
problematic.  There is also the issue that ‘public’ and ‘private’ get confused when public 
police act in a private self-regarding way or when they act in a privatised way, that is, 
protecting some communities rather than others.  This article, therefore, will use the 
admittedly awkward term, ‘non-state policing’, to cover all policing activity other than 
that performed by the state police force. 
 
 
THE BLURRING OF THE PRIVATE/PUBLIC BOUNDARY 
 
If anything, South Africa’s political transition in 1994 has seen a resurgence of crime.1 
Some would say this was the inevitable result of social controls being relaxed, the 
‘growth of the illegitimate opportunity structure’ and discovery by marginalised people 
that there was to be no change in their standard of living (Kinnes 2000: 1, 12).  Whatever 
the true rate of crime, as opposed to reported crime, there is certainly an increase in 
personal insecurity.2 Together, the increase in crime and in personal insecurity have been 
matched by an increase in non-state policing.  
    The rise of non-state policing in South Africa can be interpreted as one more aspect of 
the libertarian agenda promoting a shift from the public to the private, with the apparent 
loss of public accountability.  It should not be forgotten, however, that this shift is in 
some ways a return to the position known in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
when all policing was local, voluntary and discretionary, whether by African villages and 
clans, or by white collective responses in the ‘frontier spirit’.  The assumption of policing 
responsibilities by the public authorities from communities only took place in South 
Africa in the latter half of the nineteenth century e.g. Cape Town in the 1850s, the Natal 
Mounted Police 1874 and the Transvaalsche Rijdende Politie 1881 (Schonteich 1999: 
14). The centralisation of the South African police force did not occur until 1913.  Even 
then the policing was primarily urban, the rural areas being responsible for their own 
security.   
    No area of society took more trouble than the mining industry to organise, train and 
arm company police of its own. Philip quotes from a leaked confidential report of Gold 
Fields, outlining the role of its security service.  It was to cater for ‘prevention and 
detection of crime; protection of company assets; control of vulnerable and vital areas; 
screening of personnel; combating of labour unrest; combating subversive activities; 
training, supervision and administration of the security force; and liaison at a local level 
with the SADF, SAP and civil defence (Philip 1989: 214).  Mine security has long been 
equipped with anti-riot vehicles, riot dogs, tear gas, sjamboks, guns and pistols, and have 
used them, amongst other things, to break strikes (e.g. the miners’ strike 1987) and 
disrupt union meetings (Philip 1989: 215).  
    Though non-state security slowly decreased during the first half of the twentieth 
century, as the size and influence of the state increased, even as late as 1972 the South 
African Police (SAP) was only 34,500 strong.  Yet with the increasing security problems 
of the 1970s and 1980s, and the SAP focus on this, non-state policing once more came 
into its own.  This affected both white and black neighbourhoods and caused them to 
depend more than ever on non-state policing for crime prevention and detection.  White 
neighbourhoods sought protection from commercial security firms in what Shearing and 
Stenning call a ‘silent’ revolution, since the expansion occurred with little public debate 
or input and control from the state (Shearing & Stenning 1983: 501).   The expansion of 
this commercial security, unlike most other countries, was actively encouraged by the 
Government to relieve pressure on the overstretched SAP (Philip 1989: 213-4; Irish 1999: 
12).  The National Key Points Act 1980 went so far as to require ‘key’ strategic 
installations and factories to seek commercial protection, at the same time granting 
greater powers to such security guards.  Black neighbourhoods were, of course, not just 
neglected by the SAP in terms of crime, but were positively harassed by them as part of 
the apartheid Government’s counter insurgency strategy to restore ‘normality’ to 
ungovernable townships.  This included patrols, house-to-house searches, roadblocks, 
monitoring of organisations and arrests.  In addition the state provided arms covertly for 
local ‘warlords’ and anti-UDF militias (usually called ‘vigilantes’ in South Africa – See 
Haysom 1989 & 1990).  They operated against individuals and groups opposed to 
apartheid and in turn often spurred anti-vigilantist groups against perceived collaborators 
with the regime (Brogden & Shearing 1993: 85-88; Haysom 1989: 188-199; 1990: 63-
82).  Other self-styled self-defence units (SDU) and self-protection units (SPU) arose to 
fight off rival political militias such as those associated with the ANC and the IFP in 
KwaZulu-Natal (Shaw 1995: 41-42).  The apartheid years also saw a large number of 
autonomous groups arise to deal with township crime, frustrated that the SAP did so little 
to protect their residents or investigate crime.  There were vigilante groups, street 
committees, the Makgotlas (a revival of customary courts with an ethnic base) and the 
Township People’s Courts, which covered a range of procedures from responsible and 
orderly investigation with restrained punishments, to the summary violent justice of the 
Comrades and kangaroo courts (Seekings 1992; Brogden & Shearing 1993: 143-165).  
Both white and black communities had ready access to guns either legally, on the black 
market or from the agents of their acknowledged political leaders. 
    So was established a tradition by both white and black communities of seeking their 
own forms of policing in a context where the state offered very little and what was 
offered was seen as at best, inadequate and at worst, hostile, racist and illegitimate.  
    The overall picture of non-state policing in the last twenty years is perhaps captured, 
not by thinking in terms of a straightforward loss from the public arena back to the 
private one, but of a growing interpenetration and overlap; or even of the growth of non-
state policing into new, previously unpoliced areas.  Examples of this inter-penetration 
abound.  There is recruitment from one sector to the other, so that state police (and state 
security force personnel) have been recruited by private security firms, autonomous 
residential security organisations and vigilante groups.3 In addition, community anti-
crime groups such as the apartheid-era SDUs and SPUs have been absorbed into the 
public police reservists.  Then there is an increasing exchange of information about the 
patterns of crime, policing techniques, anti-crime technology4 and (at least covertly) the 
disclosure of public criminal records to private police groups (Shaw 1995: 79).  Finally, 
private security personnel have been engaged by public and quasi-public bodies, such as 
the South African Railways and the Airports Company, which is in charge of South 
Africa’s three international airports.  It is not easy, therefore, to maintain a sharp 
distinction between state and non-state as some authors have done (Irish 1999: 9-10). 
    The traditional distinction sees the one offering protection to the public and the other to 
their clients.  Yet in the South African context, the public police still do not offer a 
uniform service, or at least certain sections of the public feel relatively neglected 
compared with others.5 On the other hand, non-state policing, both commercial and 
informal, very often offers protection ‘beyond the bounds of duty’, that is outside its 
client base, if for no other reason than it is good for support (financial and communal) to 
be seen to be public spirited.  Nor is the distinction between state and non-state policing 
clear cut when it comes to accountability, as if the one is only accountable to the market 
and the other to various levels of government and thus to the electorate.  Security 
companies, at least, have to operate under the law passed by citizens’ representatives and 
are liable to penal sanctions if they do not; whilst on the other side of the divide the 
transparency and accountability of the public police is apparently not sufficient to prevent 
significant levels of criminality, corruption and human rights abuses among them.  In 
fact, the Independent Complaints Directorate is not able to conduct its own investigations 
but has to rely on the police, which is hardly an effective way of publicly monitoring the 
police.6   It is true that the state police have special legal powers which private guards do 
not have, but in a country where access to firearms licences is readily available and used, 
and citizens have the right to use coercion to arrest others suspected of committing 
serious offences, the gulf between the two groups is not so vast.  In the light of the above 
there does seem a case for arguing that the distinction between private and public 
policing is currently blurred and increasingly problematic in South Africa. 
 
 
 
CATEGORIES OF NON-STATE POLICING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
It is important to make some distinction between types of non-state policing.  Johnston 
has categorized them into three basic categories (Johnston 1992).  Firstly, there are what 
he calls the autonomous citizen responses, that is, groups that not only act independently 
of the state police, but often do not co-operate with it and are prepared to break the law to 
achieve their goals of protection and investigation (or even trials and sentencing).  They 
are characterised by reactive, ad hoc and often violent methods of control.  These groups 
are often called vigilantes. According to Daniel Nina,  
 
Vigilantism will adopt either a crime or social order approach.  In either case, it is linked directly to the use 
of physical force and intimidation at levels not normally used by the state.  In the denial of the state as the 
guarantor of the social order, vigilantism will invoke an ‘imagined order’ that either existed in the past (in 
its decadent mode), or never existed but is desired (in its idealized mode)…. Vigilantism appropriates state 
functions in a way that creates a parallel sovereign power that is unregulated (Nina 2001).  
 
Vigilante groups were widespread under apartheid in the townships and frequently had a 
political agenda.  Since the democratic transition, however, such activity has returned to 
focusing on social ordering and crime control rather than political activity.  The former 
need not necessarily be against the law, although clearly were as regards the 300 
witchcraft related murders between 1990 and 1999 in the Northern Province (Hills 2000: 
61).  The crime control element is fuelled by frustration with respect to the SAPS’s 
inability, through lack of resources and training, to provide security, or who, in extreme 
cases, actually collaborate with criminals (See Mail & Guardian, 18.8.2000).  Currently 
Self-Defence Units and Self Protection Units (Thulare 1996: 51; cf. Shaw 1995: 41-2), 
kangaroo Courts and anti-crime groups are found across the country and deaths 
frequently occur at their hands.
    Though most vigilantes are small, loosely organised and sporadic, there are some large 
formal ones as well.  The largest such vigilante group in South Africa is ‘Mapogo a 
matamaga’, formed in 1996 in the Northern Province.  The group has become infamous 
for its sjambokking and brutal assaults of alleged criminals. Initially concerned with 
protecting rural communities, it now also patrols the suburbs of Johannesburg and 
Pretoria.  Its leaders claim 10,000 members in Gauteng and 40,000 in Northern Province 
and Mpumalanga.  Its president says: 
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Naturally, as crime is escalating in all places, almost everyone wants to join Mapogo.  They feel protected 
by us because of our approach to crime.  The main thing that attracts members…is that we know how to 
deal with criminals.  We believe in corporal punishment and that really works  (Africa Research Bulletin, 
1.2000). 
 
    They say their investigations are effective because they work with the community 
members, then ‘arrest’ the alleged criminal.  Before handing them over to the police, 
members mete out their own brand of ‘medicine’ to the suspects to ‘cure them of their 
bad ways’ (Africa Research Bulletin, 1.2000; Mail & Guardian, 28.1.2000). 
    Another well-known vigilante group is ‘People Against Gangsterism and Drugs’ 
(PAGAD), based largely in Cape Town.  Concern about local gang killings in Cape Town 
had reached a point by 1994 that an influential anti-crime group representing 30 
communities was formed. It worked within the law using marches and demonstrations, 
both to condemn gang violence and to protest against police policies that were perceived 
as racist for their failure to allocate adequate resources to the black and coloured 
communities and their poor response to (if not complicity with) the organised crime.  In 
1996 they were overtaken by PAGAD (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs) a group 
that felt no constraint to work within the law.  It began with a series of widely publicised 
punishments and assassinations of drug dealers. Following ultimatums to them to leave 
the area or face ‘the mandate of the people’, they launched bomb attacks on most of the 
leading drug dealers.  Within two years they had executed 30 gang leaders and drug 
dealers and had seriously decimated the gangs, although not without precipitating 
reprisals from the newly allied gangs (Kinnes 2000: 37).  Over time PAGAD attacks 
shifted to police officers, police stations (for weapons) and businesses that refused to 
make ‘donations’.  By June 1998 they appeared to adopt an Islamist anti-West agenda 
and switch their attention to Western capitalist targets, if the spate of bomb attacks in 
Cape Town (18 between June 1998 and August 2000) is correctly attributed to them.  
Initially the media, business and some members of the Government were sympathetic to 
their anti-crime initiative, but as it has adopted its urban terrorist stance, any support has 
evaporated, except for certain elements of the Islamist community. (Shaw 1996: 170-1; 
Eastern Province Herald, 19.7.2000)  
    In addition to the autonomous citizen responses, there are what Johnson calls 
‘responsible’ citizen responses.  These refer to those that are done with the approval or 
co-operation of the public police.  Some are based on residents groups, such as those in 
KwaZulu-Natal who operate vehicle patrols with the co-operation of the SAPS and 
private security firms.  Similarly, the residents of Observatory, a district in Cape Town, 
have formed a non-profit company and hire police reservists for armed foot patrols.  
Others are based on city businesses such as the blocks in the city centre of Johannesburg, 
which are protected and patrolled by security guards (Shaw 1995: 77).  Still others are 
based on farms such as the ‘Farm Security Service’ in the Free State, which has engaged 
security firms to patrol the farms following a large numbers of attacks and killings.8
    Also working within the framework of the Constitution and the law, but providing their 
own distinctive policing, are some of the tribal communities of the former homelands and 
elsewhere.  1,500 traditional courts are recognised in the Black Administration Act.  
 
Though it is being set up and paid for by farmers, it co-operates with the police and local 
commandos (Africa Research Bulletin, 9.1998).  It should be pointed out, however, that 
SAPS approval does not necessarily mean that the ‘responsible’ groups avoid the 
brutality of the vigilantes.  In KwaZulu-Natal it was reported that employees of a private 
farm protection organisation (including police reservists), working with the SAPS and 
SADF, had engaged in a string of attacks on farm labourers, leaving two dead and sixteen 
badly injured. The assaults were against those suspected of housebreaking and holding 
illegal weapons (Mail & Guardian, 8.9.2000). 
Many have largely broken down as a result of the forces of modernisation and the 
discrediting of the traditional leaders due to their collaboration with the apartheid regime.  
In these circumstances, those found guilty in the traditional courts simply ignore the fines 
imposed.   Others, however, have maintained a measure of authority over those living 
under the jurisdiction of a chief.  In these situations arrests are made by tribal police and 
courts pass verdict on those who have disturbed the social order by their petty theft, 
fights, out of wedlock pregnancies, adultery and civil disputes. Though they police 
customary law, traditional leaders do so only within the spirit and objects of the Bill of 
Rights. (Zwane 1994: 43; Stack: 1997: 23-4). 
    The third group of non-state policing is the registered private security industry, which, 
amongst other things, provides guards and armed response units to protect the wealthier 
suburbs, and hence largely white communities, of every South African city.  Once 
dominated by white entrepreneurs, it has recently seen a rapid expansion in black owned 
businesses, some of which have grown into large businesses thanks to Government tender 
procedures that favour black or racially diverse companies (Irish 1999: 19).  The industry 
now employs 167,000 active security officers.9 This is 40,000 more than the SAPS and 
86,000 more than SAPS personnel who perform policing duties (Schonteich 1999: 1).  Of 
the 5,586 government licensed security businesses, 4,180 are concerned with what might 
be termed policing, namely 2,960 undertake guarding, 690 offer armed response upon 
electronic alarm systems being triggered and 530 are engaged in cash-in-transit 
businesses.10 The Government agency responsible for supervising the industry, the 
Security Industry Regulatory Authority (formerly the Security Officers Interim Board 
prior to February 2001), checks for criminal records of would be employees (though not 
after their employment), inspects firms’ records, and approves the training centres where 
courses are offered for different levels of security duty.  The courses, however, offer only 
the most rudimentary knowledge of law and use of firearms.  In South Africa, security 
guards do not have the powers of the SAPS, only those belonging to all citizens, but these 
include the right to hold a gun under licence and to use that weapon, or other means such 
as C/S or pepper gas, in self-defence or to effect a citizens arrest of someone suspected of 
a serious crime.   
    The industry has been plagued with dubious practices, particularly by some of the 
small, sometimes unregistered, operators.  These have tried to establish themselves by 
cutting costs through paying wages below the national minimum and skimping on 
firearms training.  Stories of illegal activities and of the misuse of weapons are common.  
Perhaps the most notorious was that of Louis van Schoor who, as a private security guard 
shot dead 41 alleged burglars over several years in the late 1980s.  Shocking as the 
shootings were, there was also the parallel story that the SAPS and magistrates had 
repeatedly failed to prosecute him or had discharged him (Shaw1996: 169; Shaw 1995: 
79).  Another tragic case was when security officers, armed with electric batons for 
crowd control, provoked a stampede at Tembisa near Johannesburg in 1996 leaving 16 
dead.  At the more mundane level, it is disturbing that the industry is so weakly 
supervised.  The regulatory authority when it was known as the Security Officers Interim 
Board, revoked the accreditation of 30 training institutions and a handful of registered 
firms, but contraventions of the code of conduct by registered firms is widespread and the 
SAPS has done little to tackle the large number of unregistered security businesses 
operating outside the law.   
    Inevitably over such a large country as South Africa, there is considerable local 
variation and generalisation about non-state policing is difficult.  The case study of 
Grahamstown that follows is, therefore, a highly localised account.  Nevertheless it 
illustrates some of the normative and policy issues involved.  It does not seek to give 
equal weight to all three categories of non-state policing, but to record the actual balance 
found there.  This means, therefore, that much of the account focuses on commercial 
guarding. 
 
 
 
THE CASE OF GRAHAMSTOWN 
 
Grahamstown is a small city of 120,000 in the Eastern Cape, roughly mid-way between 
Port Elizabeth and East London.  The city is still, as regards settlement patterns, largely 
divided by race, with a smaller affluent west Grahamstown and the larger and much 
poorer townships lying to the east.  It has 4 police officers on patrol duty at any given 
time and 2 response vehicles (although in the daytime it is effectively 19, counting 
detectives, public order police and the crime prevention unit).  For all its apparent calm in 
the city centre, there are something like 600 cases per month of reported crime.  As 
regards serious crime, between August 1999 and August 2000 monthly averages were 4 
for murder, 8 for rape, 9 for robbery, 89 for housebreaking and theft, though reported 
crime overall is said to be down on 1999.11 What is the evidence of the three types of 
self-policing in the city? 
    A survey of 120 homes in the wealthier western suburbs showed 83% were protected 
by electronic alarms linked to a security firm’s armed response team, which attended to 
calls within minutes.  Those that were not protected were found to be mainly stoics, dog 
owners, stay-ins, or all three.  Overall some 1800 homes are currently covered by such 
security provision.  Security firms, the in-house security provision of Rhodes University 
Campus Protection Unit, the local municipality and other interested parties meet monthly 
with the SAPS in a Multi-Disciplinary Meeting to consider crime patterns and strategies 
for handling these.  The two principal security firms, however, confirmed that their first 
priority was to protect the interests of their clients rather than to defend the rights of 
citizens, although the distinction tended to be blurred (contra Shaw 1996: 170 and Irish 
1999: 1-2) and public interest concerns did have some place in their corporate policy.  
    The largest private security business in town, founded 1991/2, has 70 guards (4 
women) and services 1300 homes. Its owner essentially saw himself as running a private 
business operation, although his sense of public responsibility extended to being a good 
neighbour to non-customers, if for no other reason than it ‘was good for business’.  In his 
view the then Security Officers Interim Board had very little teeth and although it had 
fined the company for ‘administrative failures’ as regards using unregistered guards, he 
knew of no firm who had been struck off the registration list.12 Nor was there any sense 
in which the firm was accountable to any local authorities.  Guards patrolled inside and 
outside business premises, such as banks and supermarkets and around the University 
perimeter (although this entails patrolling public highways, not private roads) and the 
main shopping precinct and its surrounds.  Guards, if need be, used pepper gas and 
handcuffs to restrain suspects prior to being handed over to the SAPS.  Only the armed 
response unit carried guns, which they did on the basis of holding a personal gun licence. 
Since the firm began business, there had only been one incident where a guard had had to 
use a gun in self-defence (when attacked with a knife).  Otherwise ‘armed response’ was 
more about deterrence and reassurance to customers than a practical tool.  Guards were 
encouraged not to use firearms if at all possible, except as warning shots, because of the 
‘legal consequences’.  The relationship with the SAPS was one of respect for specialised 
area units like detectives and dog patrol that could be phoned on a direct line, but the city 
policing and its operations office were regarded as very poor, owing to the long delay in 
answering phones.  It was alleged members of the public could wait up to an hour for a 
response for help.13
    The second largest security firm serviced 500 homes.  Like its competitor, its owner 
saw it primarily as a business, rather than having any social or community role, although 
he was similarly willing to engage in policing outside the client relationship.  In 
particular, it was claimed that on its night patrols through the city centre its guards would 
stop at anything that looked suspicious in the town to scare off would be offenders.  They 
guarded private school premises, undertook city centre street patrols on behalf of a 
number of businesses and guarded certain municipal properties.  They were also 
negotiating with the municipality to be a help-line for residents with problems concerning 
public services.  Their guards used handcuffs when necessary and preferred to take 
suspects to the police station rather than waiting for the SAPS to arrive on the scene.  
Like their competitors they sought, if at all possible, to avoid the use of firearms, though 
their ‘armed response teams’ carried them.
  
14    The only other significant private security 
organisation is The Campus Protection Unit, which patrols the Rhodes University campus 
and its environs and the public roads that go through it.  The 22 guards work in close co-
operation with the security firm that patrols the perimeter and also arrest persons.  Those 
arrested are taken to the unit base, photographed and handed over to the SAPS.  In 
addition, they provide escorts for students at night on request.  They are not allowed by 
the university to use any coercive methods, so they have to rely on persuasion and the 
sanction of reporting students to the university authorities for disciplinary procedures. 
    Managers and guards of all three organizations were uncertain about the extent of their 
role.  One firm claimed that all its guards were sworn in as peace officers, so that they 
had the power of arrest for less serious offences.  Yet though some of its guards believed 
this, others denied it.  Guards of both firms also held divergent views about the 
circumstances in which they were prepared to use firearms. Despite the speed of their 
response to alarm calls from owners or through the electronic systems being triggered 
and the presence of large signs on private homes warning of their surveillance, both firms 
and the campus security conceded that break-ins continued.   
    In addition to private security firms, there are a number of autonomous citizen 
responses in Grahamstown.  Schonteich’s research found that although overall 61% of 
Eastern Cape residents said there had never been an incident of vigilanate activity in their 
community, there was a much higher reporting of it among black respondents.  Only half 
of them ‘could say with certainty that no act of vigilantism had taken place in their 
community, with 20% saying there had and 31% being unsure’ (Schonteich 2000: 50).  
On the other hand 75% of white and coloured respondents said that no acts of vigilantism 
had ever taken place in their communities.  In Grahamstown this same racial pattern is 
apparent.  There had been several groups operating in the townships during the apartheid 
era, but after 1994 the principal one was the ‘Anti-Crime Committee’ (ACC). This 
organised street patrols and investigated cases brought to it of theft, rape and the like by 
the community.  Their Organiser said that they were able to establish the ‘guilty party’ 
through the use of informers, who would not have given evidence to the police because of 
their negative attitudes towards them developed over the apartheid era.  The ACC would 
then confront the suspect and use ‘persuasion’ to get them to hand back the goods and 
money, although it was not explained to what degree the persuasion went.  Some suspects 
were handed over to the SAPS, but it seems others were given community sanctions.  
Schonteich’s black focus group in Grahamstown alleged that suspects were only 
apprehended if they could be identified and if there was strong evidence against them, 
such as the stolen item being found in their possession.  In the case of rape it was alleged 
that the victim had to obtain a medical certificate to show she was raped (Schonteich 
2000: 52-53).  In 1996 the group had a serious leadership split, some saying it was over 
accusations of officials taking monies and goods for their own use, some saying that the 
leadership was perpetuating itself in power, and others saying it was a rift over allegiance 
to the ANC and UDM.  Since then, township residents report that other more informal 
groups (street and area committees) operate as investigators, tribunals and judges.  The 
SAPS admit to being aware of at least 2 informal groups in the townships.  For example 
an alleged rapist of a 15 year old girl was summoned to a community meeting 8 days 
after the incident to defend the charge and probably face whipping (although it was 
admitted by one interviewee that some such criminals are ‘shot’).  On twice failing to 
attend, the angry community members tore down his wattle and daub house.15      
    As regards ‘responsible’ citizen policing in Grahamstown, the best illustration of such 
a group is the Car Guards, which operate in the city centre, offering personal surveillance 
of parked cars for a voluntary contribution.  The scheme was begun in 1997 on the 
initiative of a local man who presented a case to the SAPS and the Municipality of 
protecting tourism, providing employment and reducing car theft.16
    Guards wear bright over-jackets to distinguish themselves (and which they have to hire 
from the Scheme Overseer for R5 per day) and work a day or a night shift.  There are 200 
guards on their books, though rarely more than 40 operate on any one day.  If a car thief 
is spotted, they call for help from one another or by phone to their Organiser and seek to 
arrest the person.  If the person is detained, the Organiser normally calls upon one of the 
security firms to take the accused to the police station.  According to a SAPS source, they 
have reduced car theft in the city centre by 70-80% and thus have the strong approval of 
the SAPS.  They also offer their services to public functions on the townships.
 The volunteer group 
was approved on condition that guards had their fingerprints checked for criminal 
records, were clean, well mannered and were not drunk on duty!  Though guards are 
registered with the Municipality, they are accountable to their Organiser and through him 
to the Community Police Forum.   
    One small area of 4 roads in the wealthier suburbs has its own ‘prowlers’ or ‘bobbies 
on the beat’.  Four police reservists, two male and two female, are employed (for 55R per 
month per participant in the scheme) by some of the residents to patrol their roads 7am to 
5pm.  They wear SAP (sic) bibs and simply carry radios.  The scheme, which was 
actually initiated by the local Community Police Forum after a spate of burglaries in 
which one burglar was shot dead, has the recognition of the SAPS.  A similar action has 
17 
recently been undertaken by the residents of another small private estate, who pay for two 
private guards to patrol their area 6pm to 6am.18
    The spatial pattern of non-state policing in Grahamstown is clear.  The townships 
resort to vigilantes (with a few using security firms) and the wealthier suburbs use 
security firms and semi-official self-policing.  In the city centre, where the two 
communities overlap, are found the security firms and the semi-official self-policing. 
 It is intended to hand this over to the 
Community Police Forum once it is up and running. 
 
 
 
THE POLITICS OF NON-STATE POLICING 
 
How does South African society at the national and local level view the various non-state 
policing initiatives?  Taking private security firms first.  The SAPS themselves at the 
national and the local Grahamstown level, welcome partnership with security firms.  
Deputy National Commissioner of the SAPS, Zolisa Lauisa said, May 1998, ‘The 
question is not whether the police and the private security industry should co-operate.  
The question is how this co-operation should manifest itself’ (quoted in Schonteich 1999: 
27).  A Police Task Team within the National Standards Management Services Division 
published a report June 1997 suggesting areas where the security industry could assist the 
SAPS.  Included in the list was guarding buildings and shopping malls, transporting 
prisoners to court, responding to house alarms and the sharing of information and 
technical advice concerning CCTV (Schonteich 1999: 28).  Locally a senior policemen 
based in Grahamstown reiterated the desire to work with private security firms, seeing it 
as a valuable release of the SAPS time so that they could concentrate on their top 
priorities of murder, rape and armed robbery.  Their position was that the SAPS ‘must 
make use of private security’, though it was also one very much committed to developing 
community policing. 19
    The position of national and local politicians is more equivocal than the SAPS.  The 
ANC Government and in particular the senior Government ministers and officials with 
responsibility for security, are deeply suspicious of the key players within the commercial 
security industry, even though they recognize that the industry is here to stay.  On the 
other hand, the policy of the national DP (now the Democratic Alliance) has been to co-
ordinate more efficiently the Government departments concerned with the criminal 
justice system, to increase budget allocations, to establish municipal police forces funded 
on rates following a local referendum and to outsource non-core activities such as the 
SAPS secretarial services and guarding of public buildings and police stations (The 
Democratic Party 1999).  The local DP, though uneasy with non-state policing in 
principle, takes a pragmatic attitude to the existence of non-state policing.
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    The security firms are very keen that co-operation with the SAPS should continue, no 
doubt to provided them with enhanced legitimacy.  One of their national spokesmen, Roy 
Farlane, has said that, ‘private sector security is a sizeable and powerful ally of 
government and law enforcement agencies’ (quoted in Shaw 1995: 77).  At the local 
level, also, the security firms interviewed in Grahamstown had no reason to think that the 
SAPS felt threatened by them, but rather that the SAPS welcomed their contribution.  
There was contact both socially and through debriefing meetings, although little detailed 
  
information about particular suspects was exchanged.  Employees in private security 
organisations also seem anxious to work together with the SAPS in the fight against 
crime, rather than be seen as rivals.  Indeed the evidence was that when incidents 
occurred in Grahamstown, there was an expectation of co-operation. 
    As regards the local business community, proprietors perceived security firms as both 
an essential deterrent and as an efficient and fast responder.  The deterrent aspect was 
primarily about businesses not being able to afford the disruption of break-ins, rather than 
the cost of property loss, which was covered anyway by insurance.  Most, too, were 
convinced that the ‘armed response’ protection cover really did deter.  Concerning the 
speed of response, there was a widespread belief that the SAPS would either not answer 
the phone, or even if they did, would be inordinately slow in responding. One 
businessperson cited the illiteracy of the police clerk who answered the phone, such that 
they were unable to take down properly the address of the scene of the crime.  Whatever 
the truth of these perceptions, they were widely held and were sufficient for everyone 
interviewed to shrug off worries about the training, practices and accountability of 
security firm guards.  They shared a pragmatic rather than principled approach to 
policing, namely ‘does it work?’  None saw more SAPS personnel as the answer, though 
this was regularly called for by the regional newspaper.  Interestingly,  although 
Schonteich’s white focus group in Grahamstown ‘felt that the police were doing a good 
job and that they tried to solve most of the crimes reported to them’, the group stated that 
they ‘would prefer to report crimes to private security companies’ (2000: 24). 
    The local police take the same position with the ‘responsible’ citizen policing as they 
do to the security firms.  They are also seen as providing a valuable complement to public 
policing, extending their limited resources.21 Local politicians are not so certain.  The DP 
had no particular position, apart from general pragmatic support, but the local ANC 
believed that whilst they made a valuable contribution to reducing crime and creating 
employment, it would prefer the Municipality to control them so as to ensure proper 
training and full accountability to the public and so that the interests of private 
individuals can be excluded.22
    Local citizens generally perceived groups such as the Car Guards and resident street 
patrols as a useful source of protection, although residents were irritated that they had to 
pay both meter charges and the Car Guards.  Indeed the Community Police Forum was 
responsible for the Car Guards and the street patrols, (responding to an initiative from the 
one and taking the initiative in the other).
   It was interesting that one of the police reservists on the 
street patrol for the residents of Fitzroy street and herself a township resident, was also 
uncomfortable with what she saw as two levels of policing – one for the rich and one for 
the poor. 
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    There has been widespread denunciation of autonomous groups by authorities at the 
national and local level.  The South African Minister of Safety and Security has 
campaigned vigorously against them and visited townships with the specific intention of 
seeing local vigilantism and kangaroo courts dismantled.  At the local level, too, both the 
 There was also some sympathy in the 
community, however, for the local press call for greater regulation of the Car Guards 
following incidents in Port Elizabeth where guards had assaulted car owners and a traffic 
warden attempting to give a ticket to a car whose meter time had expired.  The comment 
of the spokesman for the Traffic Department in Port Elizabeth that the ‘car guard industry 
was in a state of chaos’ was, however, regarded as something of an exaggeration. 
ANC and DP denounced them.  This official position, however, does not fully capture the 
attitudes of the people of Eastern Cape.  Schonteich found that 49% of the residents of 
the Province supported alternative or traditional forms of punishment such as peoples’ 
courts, expulsion from villages and fines to be paid to the community leaders, or 
compensation to the victim.  This support was especially pronounced among rural 
inhabitants (75%, as opposed to 46% for urban areas and 45% for small towns) and also 
among black respondents (62%, as opposed to 37% for coloured and 38% for white 
respondents).  He found that such activities were justified by the respondents on the 
grounds of their effectiveness in ensuring offenders were punished, the support they leant 
traditional leaders and the efficiency with which they were able to access local 
information on crime.  Those who opposed them on the other hand, did so on the grounds 
that there should be one law for all and that the criminal justice system of the state should 
be responsible for punishing offenders (Schonteich 2000: 45-7).  Most local support 
appeared to come from the black/township dwellers, who argued that they preferred to 
see the community take the responsibility. 
    Though no one foresees the early eradication of non-state policing, whatever its 
manifestation, it is clear that South African society is far from reaching a consensus about 
its attitude in principle towards it and what should be the future policy. 
 
 
 
THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF NON-STATE POLICING  
     
Non-state policing is engrained in every community of South Africa.  It is ubiquitous to 
the point that few challenge its legitimacy, even if they criticise some of its practices.  
There are few in South Africa who would insist that the state be given a monopoly of all 
policing functions and that non-state policing should be proscribed, with its units 
disbanded and/or absorbed into police reserves.  Many would concede that the market can 
never ensure that there is equal provision and access (Thulare 1996; Zwane 1994; Shaw 
1995), but deficiencies in available resources, training and institutionalised accountability 
for the SAPS make it impossible to contemplate them simply taking over non-state police 
roles in addition to their current responsibilities.  For all the fine words of the South 
African Constitution asserting the right to ‘freedom and security of person’, the state is 
not yet in a position to provide that through the sole use of its own police force.  Even the 
force it does have has not yet been brought under full democratic control.  Despite the 
formal institutions of oversight (the Ministry of Safety and Security, National and 
Provincial Parliaments, the Municipalities and Local Community Police Forums) there 
are serious problems with lawless behaviour by the SAPS.  There are at the time of 
writing (August 2000) more than 14,000 criminal cases against members of the SAPS 
before the courts or under investigation.  More than 1000 policemen have been charged 
with corruption since 1996.  These include not just petty misdemeanors, but car theft, 
murder, rape and syndicate crimes such as hijackings.24
    If non-state policing is inevitable and indispensable, then many see the immediate task 
as bringing the ‘responsible’ elements under thorough statutory legislation, so that it is 
 The priority for the Government 
is surely to improve the quality and strength of the SAPS.  In the foreseeable future, 
therefore, non-state policing will continue to be an integral part of South African life.   
more fully accountable to the public and a fit to be a partner for the SAPS.  Thus the 
ANC government made a step towards this with its Security Industry Regulation Bill, 
2001, which requires compulsory registration of security service providers and intends to 
enforce standards more strictly than the previous Security Officers Acts of 1987 and 
1997.  Even this approach, however, is likely to be hampered by the lack of resources to 
implement recommendations.  The former Security Officers Interim Board was 
manifestly under-resourced and it remains to be seen if the registration levy is sufficient 
to self-finance the new Security Industry Regulatory Authority.  As regards autonomous 
groups, they will continue to be outlawed, although little is likely to be done to bring 
them to an end.  It is revealing that between 1996-2000 there were 607 arrests of Mapogo 
members, but only 63 came to court and only 14 led to convictions (Sekhonyane 2000: 
3). 
    Such tighter regulatory control would still, of course, allow for the possibility of 
further delegation to the security industry of roles currently undertaken by the SAPS.  
Schonteich argues for extending privatisation, placing most policing functions, apart from 
where the use of firearms is required, in the hands of commercial companies.  In its 
favour such a strategy would release the SAPS to specialise in ‘bandit catching’ 
(Schonteich 1999).  Superficially it is attractive to consider tapping into the large 
resources of the commercial security industry.  There are thought to be three times as 
many commercial security guards in South Africa as uniformed police and twice as many 
vehicles.  However it is unlikely to be attractive to the ANC Government, wedded to the 
principle that all social services should be offered on the basis of universal provision 
rather than being no more than a guaranteed minimum provision.  Many, too, would be 
uneasy with increasing accountability to clients, rather than to the wider public.  The only 
possible change might be a degree of state co-optation as regards some of the ‘approved’ 
private initiatives, in particular the city car guards.  Bringing car guards, or even street 
patrols, operationally under the umbrella of the state police would curtail the excesses 
and could be financed by local taxes.25
    Nor is there likely to be a change in social practices as regards the use of non-state 
policing.  Exigencies demand and practice has habituated anticipation by (and in large 
measure a support for) non-state forms of policing.  Such is the current low priority given 
by the SAPS on protection of property that few, including the SAPS themselves, would 
deny that non-state policing of whatever hue is seen as the best available deterrent and 
the fastest responder in time of emergency.  The specific form of non-state protection that 
people look to, however, will be determined as much by financial ability as community 
tradition.   
 Overall, therefore, there seems little likelihood of 
any serious change in the current policing structure in South Africa.   
    Those able to afford razor fencing, high walls, electronic devices linked to armed 
response units, or physical guarding of property, have reported feeling an increased sense 
of security when within the confines of their purchased security.  Yet daily news reports 
remind them that it is by no means complete security and certainly does not extend to 
when they venture out of their ‘forts’.  Those with less income will continue to look to 
local level self-help groups and autonomous security groups.  The difference in cost is 
not inconsiderable; armed response firms typically charge at least R3-4000 p.a., street 
patrols cost around R650 p.a., and Mapogo’s annual subscription is R50-165 (though 
farms and big businesses can be charged up to R10,000). 
    Though the security sought may have different levels of sophistication, legality and 
effectiveness, there is one feature that is becoming increasingly common to all 
communities, namely, social isolation.  Communities become wary of the stranger in a 
crime-ridden society and non-state policing is the method chosen by many for securing 
exclusion.  ‘No-go areas’ keep the SAPS, opposition political groups and ‘undesirables’ 
from their streets in black townships.  In the largely white suburbs more physical barriers 
are used to establish ‘gated communities’ behind road booms and high walls patrolled by 
commercial security guards and barring undesirable new residents and casual passers-by 
(Mail & Guardian 12.1.2001). Yet when sections of society insulate themselves in this 
fashion, dialogue across political, class, and racial divides withers.  Social exclusion and 
urban fragmentation is no basis for the sense of a common identity, which must be the 
foundation for South Africa’s democracy.  To many this development has echoes of the 
apartheid days of racial segregation that were supposed to have been abandoned. 
    There are other adverse effects, too, of this continuing reliance on non-state policing.  
The widespread use and support for non-state policing undermines the legitimacy of the 
SAPS.  It is ironic that action, which claims it supplements and strengthens their 
legitimacy and frequently has explicit or at least implicit SAPS support, appears to have a 
contrary effect.  Non-state policing in its various forms is becoming institutionalised in 
substantial sectors of society as the normal channel of criminal justice.  This is 
particularly true in two contexts.  First, where the SAPS stand back, either to allow 
natural justice to take its course, as they did in the murder of a gangland leader in the 
Cape Flats,26 or in their failure to successfully prosecute criminals, as in the case of the 
security guard and ex-policeman who shot dead 41 alleged burglars over a space of a few 
years (Shaw 1995: 79).  In such situations the state ceases to be seen as a credible 
guarantor of personal security.  The other area where non-state policing is becoming 
institutionalised is in the rural communities, again because of the absence of visible 
SAPS policing.  Pelser et al. report that of 756 interviewed across the country in 1998, 
7% said that their community made its own arrangements to protect itself, with 80% 
saying they thought this was an effective way of securing the area.  The underlying cause 
of this use, or willingness to use, non-state policing, was dissatisfaction with the SAPS.  
Only 35% of all respondents believed the SAPS could control crime in their area.  The 
majority of rural respondents said the SAPS in their area were doing a poor job to control 
crime.  Indeed, most rural respondents rarely, if ever, saw a SAPS official and with the 
scarcity of transport and telephones, had limited access to the SAPS (Pelsner et al. 2000: 
37-38 and 60-63).  A similar finding was reported from a survey of 971 KwaMashu 
residents.  In this case nearly 60% thought local people solved crimes better than the 
SAPS (Africa Research Bulletin, 5.2000).  The danger of an irrelevant state police is that 
it can be extended to seeing the state itself as irrelevant.  And why, people might ask, 
engage with a state that fails to offer such a basic service as personal security and when 
private initiatives are available?  
    Another cause for concern is the degree to which the scale of non-state policing in 
South Africa might be exacerbating inequality.  The nature of non-state policing means 
that it can offer no equality of accessibility and adjudication, and at times even denies 
people their legal and constitutional rights. Access to non-state policing services is 
uneven, depending on location and/or wealth.  Discriminatory policing was the hallmark 
of the apartheid era by both private and public forces.  Much has changed since 1994, but 
few would deny that race and politics still influence private (and public) policing.  For 
community self-help groups it depends on local initiative and by no means all people are 
offered any provision at all.  At the commercial end of policing provision, it is clearly 
related to class and this of course is still closely linked in South Africa to race.  In 
practice, therefore, many citizens have no ready access to guarding and protecting police 
services from the private sector (or for that matter, the public sector).  The right to 
freedom and security is not universally available.  In cases where non-state policing 
undertakes adjudication, there are inevitably serious concerns about standards of 
investigation, scrutiny of evidence, the sanctions available and a consistency of treatment 
for citizens. Amidst stories of sincerity and earnestness, are others of hasty verdicts, 
presumption of guilt and even ‘courts’ taken over by gangs or local powerful figures bent 
on extortion (Brogden & Shearing 1993: 162-163). 
    Beyond the discrimination of provision is the nurturing of attitudes of discrimination.  
Some non-state policing promotes an under-class of citizens.  The discourse is of 
‘undesirable elements’ and of those who act in a ‘sub-human’ way.  They must be 
‘cleansed’ from society by any means available since they have forfeited their rights.  
Non-state police responses to them (and the SAPS, sadly) have been guilty of discarding 
lawful and humane procedures of investigation, detention, trial and punishment.  This 
violence continues with apparent impunity, since its ‘victims’ are the ‘dangerous classes’ 
of criminals who do not deserve protection. 
    A final cause for concern is the potential for some aspects of non-state policing to 
provoke a still wider use of violence.  South Africans are divided over the right of 
individuals to carry weapons or to use other means of physical force over others.  The 
right to self-defence and/or citizen arrest has to be weighed against the right to individual 
protection from unreliable and hasty methods of justice that may use violence without 
adequately establishing guilty.  Few would deny, however, that the more extensive the 
carrying of instruments of coercion, the harder to control their responsible use.  It is well 
known that instruments of violence, especially knives and firearms, are widely owned in 
South Africa.  Though often the firearms are illegal, it has to be admitted that it is very 
easy to obtain gun licences, even after recent legislation which raised the age of legal gun 
ownership from 18 to 21 (unless they are farmers, or have opened businesses), limited 
ownership to one gun for self defence (and 4 for hunting) and required renewal of the 
permits periodically.   Four and a half million are registered and millions more are 
unregistered in a country with only a population of 43 million. 
    It is within this gun culture, where there are high levels of violent crime and where 
people want to protect themselves with weapons, that non-state policing operates.  Not 
surprisingly, it commonly allows its agents to carry instruments of coercion, whether 
chemical sprays, handcuffs, batons and licensed pistols in the case of commercial security 
firms; or a variety of weapons in the case of informal non-state policing.  Even in the 
commercial and ‘responsible’ citizen group sector, the training is minimal and the 
guidelines for use are basic.  In the autonomous citizen sector, of course, there are very 
few restraints at all.  With the Government doing very little to tackle the ownership and 
use of firearms and other weapons generally and their use by non-state policing groups in 
particular, they are freely used in the course of non-state policing with little supervision.   
    The most fundamental human responses to the use of force is counterforce.  Criminal 
violence threatens and angers people: threatened they try to defend themselves; angered 
they want to retaliate (Gurr 1970: 232).  But as citizens arm themselves, or call on armed 
non-state policing personnel for protection and revenge, the fear is that criminals will 
undertake their activity prepared to meet defensive violence with violence.  As PAGAD 
members, for instance, paraded their Uzi submachine guns, Magnum revolvers and 
automatic rifles, the gangs of the Cape Flats formed a coalition to fight the vigilantes, and 
increased their organisational and weaponry sophistication to counter the common threat.  
One court case revealed that ‘The Hard Livings’ gang stole military-type weapons from a 
police armoury in an effort to match PAGAD.   
     
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The issue of policing is but one measure of democratic progress, but it is not an 
insignificant one.  In 1994 South Africa officially abandoned apartheid and embraced 
democratic constitutionalism.  Seven years later the prevalence of non-state policing 
permits the continuance of authoritarian values and practices; divides communities on the 
basis of their ability to secure alternative policing for a failing state provision; and 
nurtures the view that the rule of law is more of an obstacle to maintaining social order 
than as an effective guarantee of it.   With a state monopoly of policing being a non-
viable option for a country with limited public resources like South Africa, some other 
way must be sought to ensure that a public good like policing becomes accountable, 
consistent and humane. 
 
NOTES 
 
I am most grateful to the two anonymous referees who made valuable suggestions to a 
previous draft of this article. 
 
    1. In a survey of victims of crime in the last twelve months it was found that 16% of 
the black population, 39% of the white, 18% of the coloured and 32% of the Indian were 
affected.  ‘This would appear to represent more than a doubling of crime experiences 
during the last four years’ (Humphries 2000: 4). (The use here and elsewhere of racial 
categories does not imply that the author condones the apartheid racial divisions.)  
According to the Crime Information Analysis Centre of the SAPS (quoted in Schonteich 
2000: 21), the 20 most common serious crimes increased from 1,998,000 reported crimes 
in 1994 to 2,154,000 in 1998, an increase of nearly 8%, though the population in that 
time rose 10%.   
    2.  In 1997 47% said they felt unsafe, compared with 16% in 1994 (Schonteich 1999: 
15).  Data from the November 1999 Human Sciences Research Council National Opinion 
Survey show 44% ‘personally felt safe or very safe most days’, 47% ‘felt unsafe or very 
unsafe’ (Humphries 2000: 1).  
    3. One of the reviewers of this article made the pertinent observation that the private 
security industry played an important role in the transition to democracy in South Africa 
by absorbing from the former security establishment and liberation armies those who had 
few other skills. 
    4. For example, Port Elizabeth is introducing an automatic photo reader system to 
catch speeding motorists.  The Technology will be installed and maintained by a private 
firm that will take 30% of the income from the ensuing traffic fines (Eastern Province 
Herald, 3.8.2000).  
    5. According to the Department of Safety and Security’s In Service of Safety: white 
paper on safety and security, Pretoria 1998: 4, ‘74% of the country’s police stations were 
situated in the white suburbs or business districts’ (quoted in Pelser et al. 2000: 58).  The 
number of residents per police officer in 2000 range from 313 in Free State to 669 in 
Northern Province, with Eastern Cape as 462 (Schonteich 2000: 17).   
    6. The Human Rights Committee of South Africa says that crime statistics for 1997 
indicate that police officers are ‘almost three times more likely to be involved in criminal 
activities than members of the general public (quoted in Mail & Guardian, 18.8.2000). 
    7.  See Mail & Guardian, 11.8.2000.  In October 2000 the Eastern Province Herald 
reported a man accused of housebreaking and rape was beaten to death by locals at 
Lujecweni  (3.10.2000) and at Walmer Township residents attacked five youths who had 
allegedly been involved in robbery and the stabbing to death of an old man.  They were 
so badly beaten that one was reported to have died (3&6.10.2000). 
   8. Farm killings, in South Africa numbered 464 between 1994 and February 1998, and 
2,730 attacks between 1992-7.   
    9. Security Officers Interim Board (quoted in Eastern Province Herald 20.7.2000); it 
had been 100,000 in 1997.  There are also something like 60,000 working in ‘in-house 
security’ and an unknown number in other sectors of commercial security such as private 
investigation and intelligence. 
    10. Security Officers Interim Board figures for 1998 (quoted in Schonteich 1999: 23).   
    11. Interviews with Crime Analysis Officer for Grahamstown and with senior police 
officers August 2000.  Figures for the Eastern Cape reveal high crime levels.  The 
reported number of the 20 most serious crimes increased from 244,176 in 1994 to 
255,474 in 1998, an increase of 4.6%.  Reported murders in the same period fell to 3,769 
from the 1994 figure of 4,492 (CIAC figures quoted in Schonteich 2000: 21).  Humphries 
reports that 19% of the Eastern Cape residents said they had been victims of crime in the 
last twelve months (Humphries 2000: 5).   
    12. The firm was also a member of South Africa Intruder Detection Service 
Association (SAIDSA), though there was no sense of accountability to them either. 
    13. Interview with proprietor, 19.8.2000.   
    14. Interview with proprietor, 2.9.2000. 
    15. Eastern Province Herald, 25.8.2000, and interviews with Steven Crossman, 
journalist with East Cape News and with a neighbour who asked to be anonymous. 
    16. There had initially been two groups, but one soon sold out to the current one.   
    17. Interview with Organiser, 8.8.2000. 
    18. This street patrol was organised on the initiative of police officers living there! 
    19. Interview with senior police officer, 2.8.2000.  The SAPS members are being sent 
on a one-year management and specialised skills course in a bid to improve community 
policing  (Eastern Province Herald, 18.8.2000). 
    20. Interview with Chairman, 21.8.2000. 
    21. Interview with senior police officer, 2.8.2000.   
    22. Interview with local ANC Regional Representative, 23.8.2000. 
    23. Interview with Chair, 30.8.2000.   
    24. P. Pigou writes in the Mail and Guardian 18.8.2000, ‘Last weekend’s papers 
included stories of three Eastern Cape policemen who have been charged with culpable 
homicide…after allegedly running over and killing a teenager who was dragged behind a 
moving car; a man who was allegedly abducted, assaulted and buried alive by members 
of the East Rand murder and robbery unit; a juvenile who was illegally locked up in 
police cells with adult prisoners and killed; a 16 year old girl who is suing the police after 
being raped in police cells and infected with HIV by a police officer…; and a member of 
the police crime intelligence unit allegedly linked to a prostitution racket in 
Johannesburg’. 
    25. The most radical proposal is that which seeks to actively promote self-policing by 
local ‘communities’, whether territorial or not (Brogden & Shearing 1993).  In other 
words it argues for giving the major role of ordering communities to communities.  It has 
as its premise that policing is everybody’s business.  This would mean that the 
neighbourhood can determine what is acceptable, for instance, in terms of noise, beach 
nudity or licensing hours; the football club or Trade Union can decide what levels of 
marshalling they want at match or march; the business company can have its own policy 
as regards employees caught stealing company property; the Muslim community can ban 
alcohol sales/use from its locality; and the tribal authority can determine its ‘traditional’ 
rules (Zwane 94, Stack 97).  
    26. Rashazd Staggie, the hard Livings gang boss was publicly murdered in August 
1996 during a PAGAD demonstration outside his Cape Flats home. 
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